Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani has allowed Iran—via its proxies—to expand its military influence in Iraq, specifically Kirkuk and Sinjar provinces, in recent days. The Popular Mobilization
atest fromISW
Iran Update, April 17, 2023
Apr 17, 2023 – Press ISW
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani has allowed Iran—via its proxies—to expand its military influence in Iraq, specifically Kirkuk and Sinjar provinces, in recent days. The Popular Mobilization Authority—the official governing body of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—announced on April 17 that the PMF will establish a new operational headquarters in Kirkuk Province on April 17. Sudani also gave permission to Popular Mobilization Forces Chairman Faleh al Fayadh to create a new PMF-affiliated brigade in Sinjar, Ninewa province on April 17, according to UK-based Al Araby. An unidentified PMF source cited by Al Araby claimed that the brigade will be comprised of Sinjar residents recommended by local officials and PMF leadership as well as members of the PMF and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)-affiliated Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS). Sudani may have permitted these developments because his authority over the PMF has weakened in recent weeks. Sudani has suffered political losses to challenges from the Badr Organization in Diyala Province and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, who sponsored electoral laws that will prevent Sudani from securing another term as prime minister, as CTP has reported.
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 17, 2023
Apr 17, 2023 – Press ISW
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is seemingly regaining some favor with Russian President Vladimir Putin, likely as a result of the Russian conventional military’s inability to accomplish the tasks Putin had set for it during the winter offensive in Donbas. Wagner forces appear to be receiving reinforcements, ammunition, and political recognition – which is a stark deviation from the Kremlin’s previous efforts to expend Wagner forces and Prigozhin in Bakhmut since at least January 2023. Wagner-affiliated sources announced on April 17 that Wagner is training up to three motorized rifle brigades of mobilized personnel to reinforce Wagner‘s flanks in Bakhmut. Prigozhin also confirmed that Russian airborne forces (VDV) are operating alongside Wagner and indicated that Wagner is actively receiving artillery shells. Prigozhin advocated for Wagner to receive more artillery shells, which indicates that Prigozhin has reestablished his supply of ammunition from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). The Russian State Duma will also consider amendments to the Russian law on veterans’ rights to grant veteran status to private military companies (PMCs) and volunteers. Prigozhin had been routinely advocating for Wagner personnel to be recognized as participants of the ”special military operation” in Ukraine, and the adoption of this bill would signify that Prigozhin’s position in the Kremlin inner circle has improved.
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 16, 2023
Apr 16, 2023 – Press ISW
The Russian military command appears to be increasingly shifting responsibility for offensive operations in Ukraine to the Russian Airborne troops (VDV). The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on April 16 that it is highly likely that VDV commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky has returned to a “major” but unspecified role in Ukraine after reports that the Russian MoD replaced him on January 13. UK MoD noted that Teplinsky’s return to command in Ukraine will not be limited to just VDV units, but that it is also likely that Teplinsky will try to promote the VDV’s traditional role as an elite force. ISW previously assessed on April 1 that milblogger speculation that the Russian MoD recalled Teplinsky from ”leave“ suggests that Russia may be preparing to reshuffle senior commanders following the failed winter offensive and in preparation for a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive. The UK MoD’s apparent confirmation of Teplinsky’s reappointment to a senior command position supports ISW’s assessment, and additionally suggests that the Russian military command is likely seeking to place an increased emphasis on the role of VDV elements in Russian offensive operations. VDV units are actively engaged along critical sectors of the front in Luhansk Oblast and near Bakhmut and have recently received TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems, further indicating that the Russian military command may seek to elevate the VDV to greater operational prominence.
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 15, 2023
Apr 15, 2023 – Press ISW
Reporting from some Western sources that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin called for Russia to end its war against Ukraine is inaccurate. Some Western reports covering Prigozhin’s April 14 essay on a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive and the future of the war miscontextualized a rhetorical statement in which Prigozhin established a strawman argument he attributed to Russia’s “internal enemies” who seek to rationalize Russia ending the war in Ukraine now. The point of his essay was to attack this strawman, not to advance it. Prigozhin actually called on Russia to commit to a decisive fight that will either defeat Ukraine or result in a temporary Russian defeat that will catalyze Russia’s nationalist rebirth and set conditions for future victory. A full reading of Prigozhin‘s essay, titled, “Only an Honest Fight: No Negotiations,” does not lend itself to any reasonable interpretation that Prigozhin advocated for an end to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
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Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, April 12, 2023
Apr 14, 2023 – Press ISW
Iraq and Syria. ISIS is executing a decentralized military campaign in northeastern Syria to destabilize the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). ISIS strategic communications provide guidance for operational and tactical commanders implementing the campaign. ISIS’s campaign design assumes military success will gain the support of local populations by delegitimizing the SDF as a security provider while lengthening the conflict to create time for ISIS to set conditions for the return to the “caliphate.”
Somalia. The Somali Federal Government’s (SFG) inability to escalate multiple fronts against al Shabaab could allow the group to repel renewed Somali offensive operations in central Somalia. Insufficient local support and the absence of expected regional troops are preventing or delaying the SFG from expanding additional fronts in central and southern Somalia, which will allow al Shabaab to concentrate its resources on the active Somali forces more effectively. Outreach to clans in central Somalia or the arrival of Kenyan or Djiboutian troops in Somalia could enable the SFG to increase operations on another front.
Pakistan. A large-scale campaign against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is unlikely to model previous Pakistani counterterrorism campaigns that helped contain the TTP between 2007 and 2014. The decentralization of the TTP, the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, and increasingly complex political conditions may limit the effectiveness of any potential campaign.
Afghanistan. Recent Taliban operations targeting Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) are targeting its ground lines of communication (GLOC) into Iran. Iran may be conditioning closer trade ties with the Taliban government on the Taliban giving priority to targeting ISKP networks near the Afghanistan-Iran border.
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 14, 2023
Apr 14, 2023 – Press ISW
The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray Russia as an equal defense partner with China ahead of Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu’s visit to Moscow from April 16 to 18. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 14 that Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu will meet with Li to discuss bilateral defense cooperation as well as issues of regional and global security. Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Qin Gang stated on April 14 that China will not sell weapons to Russia and will regulate the export of items to Russia that have dual civilian and military uses. Qin‘s comments represent a continuation of China’s efforts to rhetorically downplay its support for Russia and demonstrate that there are limits to the ”no limits” partnership that Russia and China declared before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. ISW assessed that Putin was unable to secure the no-limits bilateral partnership with China that he likely hoped for when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Moscow from March 20 to 22.
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Aug 15, 2022
This page collects ISW and CTP’s updates on the conflict in Ukraine. In late February 2022, ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.
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