The West should pay close attention to the Chinese military’s preparations for urban combat, as these efforts will have profound effects on China’s policy toward Taiwan and elsewhere.
Interactive Map: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
Click here to see ISW’s Interactive Map. This map complements the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW daily produces with high-fidelity and, where possible, street-level assessments of the war in Ukraine.
The PLA’s Evolving Outlook on Urban Warfare: Learning, Training, and Implications for Taiwan
The West should pay close attention to the Chinese military’s preparations for urban combat, as these efforts will have profound effects on China’s policy toward Taiwan and elsewhere.
Latest fromISW
Iran Crisis Update, January 4, 2023
Jan 4, 2023 – Press ISW
Protester umbrella organizations appear to disagree on the timing of the upcoming planned protests. Protest coordinators from the Iranian Neighborhood Youth Union have called for countrywide demonstrations and strikes on January 6-8 to commemorate the three-year anniversary of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) shooting down of a Ukrainian civilian airplane. Other protest groups, such as those allegedly aligned with the Iranian Neighborhood United Front, have called for demonstrations only on January 8 (the Iranian Neighborhood United Front published a statement that it claimed its members signed, but not all members have confirmed their alignment with this umbrella organization thus far). This divergence suggests that the emergence of different umbrella organizations vying for the allegiance of local groups may have created a fault line within the protest movement. Such disunity could indicate that different protest leaders are competing for influence within the movement, as CTP previously argued.
https://apis.google.com/u/0/se/0/_/+1/fastbutton?usegapi=1&size=large&count=false&origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org%2Fbackgrounder%2Firan-crisis-update-january-4-2023&gsrc=3p&jsh=m%3B%2F_%2Fscs%2Fabc-static%2F_%2Fjs%2Fk%3Dgapi.lb.en.ydLROSGdlBE.O%2Fd%3D1%2Frs%3DAHpOoo_OUY4V-VcsLuRVnUuYVO758FydkA%2Fm%3D__features__#_methods=onPlusOne%2C_ready%2C_close%2C_open%2C_resizeMe%2C_renderstart%2Concircled%2Cdrefresh%2Cerefresh&id=I0_1672895720547&_gfid=I0_1672895720547&parent=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org&pfname=&rpctoken=60914429
https://www.facebook.com/plugins/like.php?action=&app_id=&channel=https%3A%2F%2Fstaticxx.facebook.com%2Fx%2Fconnect%2Fxd_arbiter%2F%3Fversion%3D46%23cb%3Df366b57a6f68f%26domain%3Dwww.understandingwar.org%26is_canvas%3Dfalse%26origin%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.understandingwar.org%252Ffc803035fc1164%26relation%3Dparent.parent&container_width=0&href=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org%2Fbackgrounder%2Firan-crisis-update-january-4-2023&layout=button_count&locale=en_US&sdk=joey&send=false&show_faces=false
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 4, 2023
Jan 4, 2023 – Press ISW
The Russian milblogger information space continues to seize on official responses to the Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian base in Makiivka to criticize endemic issues in the Russian military apparatus. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) released an official response to the strike on January 4 and attributed it to the “presence and mass use by personnel, contrary to prohibitions, of mobile telephones within range of enemy weapons systems.” The Russian MoD also claimed that the death toll of the strike is now 89, including a deputy regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Bachurin. The clear attempt by the Russian MoD to blame the strike on individual mobilized servicemen, as ISW assessed the Russian MoD would likely do on January 2, drew immediate ire from Russian milbloggers. One milblogger emphasized that it is “extremely wrong to make mobile phones guilty for strikes” and concluded that “it is not cell phones and their owners that are to blame, but the negligence of the commanders.” Several milbloggers noted that the use of cell phones on the frontline in the 21st century is inevitable and that efforts to crack down on their use are futile. The milblogger critique of the Russian MoD largely converged on the incompetence of Russian military command, with many asserting that the Russian military leadership has no understanding of the basic realities faced by Russian soldiers on the frontline and is seeking to shift the blame for its own command failures on the “faceless masses” of Russian mobilized recruits.
https://apis.google.com/u/0/se/0/_/+1/fastbutton?usegapi=1&size=large&count=false&origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org%2Fbackgrounder%2Frussian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2023&gsrc=3p&jsh=m%3B%2F_%2Fscs%2Fabc-static%2F_%2Fjs%2Fk%3Dgapi.lb.en.ydLROSGdlBE.O%2Fd%3D1%2Frs%3DAHpOoo_OUY4V-VcsLuRVnUuYVO758FydkA%2Fm%3D__features__#_methods=onPlusOne%2C_ready%2C_close%2C_open%2C_resizeMe%2C_renderstart%2Concircled%2Cdrefresh%2Cerefresh&id=I1_1672895720551&_gfid=I1_1672895720551&parent=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org&pfname=&rpctoken=23981792
https://www.facebook.com/plugins/like.php?action=&app_id=&channel=https%3A%2F%2Fstaticxx.facebook.com%2Fx%2Fconnect%2Fxd_arbiter%2F%3Fversion%3D46%23cb%3Df2ec6a199bb0fd%26domain%3Dwww.understandingwar.org%26is_canvas%3Dfalse%26origin%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.understandingwar.org%252Ffc803035fc1164%26relation%3Dparent.parent&container_width=0&href=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org%2Fbackgrounder%2Frussian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2023&layout=button_count&locale=en_US&sdk=joey&send=false&show_faces=false
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 3, 2023
Jan 3, 2023 – Press ISW
Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a series of instructions for Russian agencies and high-level officials on January 2 likely to address criticisms of the Kremlin’s treatment of military personnel and portray the Kremlin as an involved war-time apparatus. These instructions are ostensibly an effort to address grievances voiced by mothers of servicemen during a highly staged November 25 meeting with Putin. The 11 instructions direct several high-ranking members of the Russian government—including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, and Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin—and government agencies (including the Russian Ministry of Defense) to collaborate with other agencies and non-government organizations to generate a list of recommendations for addressing and improving supply, benefits, and healthcare processes for military personnel. Putin instructed the Ministry of Culture to assist the nongovernmental organization “Committee of the Fatherland Warrior’s Families” to help create documentaries and other material to showcase the “courage and heroism” of Russian forces in Ukraine and to screen domestic documentaries to “fight against the spread of neo-Nazi and neo-fascist ideology.” These instructions are unlikely to generate significant changes and will likely take significant time to implement.
https://apis.google.com/u/0/se/0/_/+1/fastbutton?usegapi=1&size=large&count=false&origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org%2Fbackgrounder%2Frussian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2023&gsrc=3p&jsh=m%3B%2F_%2Fscs%2Fabc-static%2F_%2Fjs%2Fk%3Dgapi.lb.en.ydLROSGdlBE.O%2Fd%3D1%2Frs%3DAHpOoo_OUY4V-VcsLuRVnUuYVO758FydkA%2Fm%3D__features__#_methods=onPlusOne%2C_ready%2C_close%2C_open%2C_resizeMe%2C_renderstart%2Concircled%2Cdrefresh%2Cerefresh&id=I2_1672895720554&_gfid=I2_1672895720554&parent=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org&pfname=&rpctoken=16278148
https://www.facebook.com/plugins/like.php?action=&app_id=&channel=https%3A%2F%2Fstaticxx.facebook.com%2Fx%2Fconnect%2Fxd_arbiter%2F%3Fversion%3D46%23cb%3Df1736f7fea35058%26domain%3Dwww.understandingwar.org%26is_canvas%3Dfalse%26origin%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.understandingwar.org%252Ffc803035fc1164%26relation%3Dparent.parent&container_width=0&href=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org%2Fbackgrounder%2Frussian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2023&layout=button_count&locale=en_US&sdk=joey&send=false&show_faces=false
Iran Crisis Update, January 3, 2023
Jan 3, 2023 – Press ISW
The organizational structure of the protest movement is continuing to evolve and morph as its leaders try to cohere the movement. Several different umbrella organizations for the smaller protest groups have emerged in recent months. These umbrella organizations include the Iranian Neighborhood Youth Union (INYU) and the similarly named Iranian Neighborhood United Front (INUF), among others. The INYU and INUF have both circulated lists of their members in recent days, highlighting how some protest groups belong to both umbrella organizations, and other protest groups belong to only one.[1] This apparent disunity may indicate that different protest leaders are vying for influence within the movement. This possibly internal struggle is a somewhat natural consequence of the growing cohesion within the protest movement. It does not mean that the protest movement is irrevocably divided but is a challenge protest leaders must overcome.
https://apis.google.com/u/0/se/0/_/+1/fastbutton?usegapi=1&size=large&count=false&origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org%2Fbackgrounder%2Firan-crisis-update-january-3-2023&gsrc=3p&jsh=m%3B%2F_%2Fscs%2Fabc-static%2F_%2Fjs%2Fk%3Dgapi.lb.en.ydLROSGdlBE.O%2Fd%3D1%2Frs%3DAHpOoo_OUY4V-VcsLuRVnUuYVO758FydkA%2Fm%3D__features__#_methods=onPlusOne%2C_ready%2C_close%2C_open%2C_resizeMe%2C_renderstart%2Concircled%2Cdrefresh%2Cerefresh&id=I3_1672895720556&_gfid=I3_1672895720556&parent=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org&pfname=&rpctoken=11029940
https://www.facebook.com/plugins/like.php?action=&app_id=&channel=https%3A%2F%2Fstaticxx.facebook.com%2Fx%2Fconnect%2Fxd_arbiter%2F%3Fversion%3D46%23cb%3Df1089146acf2d5%26domain%3Dwww.understandingwar.org%26is_canvas%3Dfalse%26origin%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.understandingwar.org%252Ffc803035fc1164%26relation%3Dparent.parent&container_width=0&href=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org%2Fbackgrounder%2Firan-crisis-update-january-3-2023&layout=button_count&locale=en_US&sdk=joey&send=false&show_faces=false
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 2, 2023
Jan 2, 2023 – Press ISW
Ukrainian air defenses reportedly intercepted all drones from two consecutive nights of Russian drone strike attacks against Ukraine on December 31 – January 2. Ukraine’s air force reported on January 1 that Ukrainian air defense forces shot down all 45 Russian Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones that Russia fired at Ukraine on New Year’s Eve. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesman Yuriy Ignat stated on January 1 that Ukrainian forces used the US-provided NASAMS air defense system to shoot down these drones. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 2 that Ukrainian forces intercepted all 39 Shahed-136 drones launched against Ukraine between the night of January 1 and 2. The Ukrainian General Staff again reported on January 2 that Ukrainian forces shot down all 27 Shahed-136 drones that Russian forces launched against Ukraine on January 2, though it is unclear if this figure includes the previously reported intercepts from the night between January 1 and 2. Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Vadym Skibitsky reiterated on January 1 that Russian forces only have enough cruise missiles to conduct two to three more large-scale missile attacks against Ukraine.
https://apis.google.com/u/0/se/0/_/+1/fastbutton?usegapi=1&size=large&count=false&origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org%2Fbackgrounder%2Frussian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2023&gsrc=3p&jsh=m%3B%2F_%2Fscs%2Fabc-static%2F_%2Fjs%2Fk%3Dgapi.lb.en.ydLROSGdlBE.O%2Fd%3D1%2Frs%3DAHpOoo_OUY4V-VcsLuRVnUuYVO758FydkA%2Fm%3D__features__#_methods=onPlusOne%2C_ready%2C_close%2C_open%2C_resizeMe%2C_renderstart%2Concircled%2Cdrefresh%2Cerefresh&id=I4_1672895720561&_gfid=I4_1672895720561&parent=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org&pfname=&rpctoken=79664613
https://www.facebook.com/plugins/like.php?action=&app_id=&channel=https%3A%2F%2Fstaticxx.facebook.com%2Fx%2Fconnect%2Fxd_arbiter%2F%3Fversion%3D46%23cb%3Df243b57b4ef5e4%26domain%3Dwww.understandingwar.org%26is_canvas%3Dfalse%26origin%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.understandingwar.org%252Ffc803035fc1164%26relation%3Dparent.parent&container_width=0&href=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org%2Fbackgrounder%2Frussian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2023&layout=button_count&locale=en_US&sdk=joey&send=false&show_faces=false
Iran Crisis Update, January 2
Jan 2, 2023 – Press ISW
The Iranian state security services have intensified their protest crackdown and social oppression in recent days. Security forces have substantially increased their presence in some cities, such as Javanroud and Semirom, according to social media users, after significant protests occurred there on December 31. The Khuzestan Neighborhood Youth similarly reported that security forces disrupted electricity and telephone lines and shot at citizens in Izeh on January 1. The regime has escalated efforts to reimpose social control as well. Security forces have arrested two reformist journalists in recent days and resumed using surveillance cameras to identify women not properly adhering to the mandatory hijab law in cars.
https://apis.google.com/u/0/se/0/_/+1/fastbutton?usegapi=1&size=large&count=false&origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org%2Fbackgrounder%2Firan-crisis-update-january-2&gsrc=3p&jsh=m%3B%2F_%2Fscs%2Fabc-static%2F_%2Fjs%2Fk%3Dgapi.lb.en.ydLROSGdlBE.O%2Fd%3D1%2Frs%3DAHpOoo_OUY4V-VcsLuRVnUuYVO758FydkA%2Fm%3D__features__#_methods=onPlusOne%2C_ready%2C_close%2C_open%2C_resizeMe%2C_renderstart%2Concircled%2Cdrefresh%2Cerefresh&id=I5_1672895720564&_gfid=I5_1672895720564&parent=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org&pfname=&rpctoken=98654661
https://www.facebook.com/plugins/like.php?action=&app_id=&channel=https%3A%2F%2Fstaticxx.facebook.com%2Fx%2Fconnect%2Fxd_arbiter%2F%3Fversion%3D46%23cb%3Dfb1e165ccec20c%26domain%3Dwww.understandingwar.org%26is_canvas%3Dfalse%26origin%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.understandingwar.org%252Ffc803035fc1164%26relation%3Dparent.parent&container_width=0&href=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org%2Fbackgrounder%2Firan-crisis-update-january-2&layout=button_count&locale=en_US&sdk=joey&send=false&show_faces=false
Support ISW
Your support makes our work possible, and helps spread a better understanding of current conflicts and emerging threats.
Featured Report
Aug 15, 2022
This page collects ISW and CTP’s updates on the conflict in Ukraine. In late February 2022, ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.
1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 Washington, DC 20036
ph (202) 293-5550
