Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, February 1, 2023
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Click here to see ISW’s Interactive Map. This map complements the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW daily produces with high-fidelity and, where possible, street-level assessments of the war in Ukraine.
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Latest fromISW
Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, February 1, 2023
Feb 2, 2023 – Press ISW
Iraq. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham likely made a strategic choice to decrease its attacks in some areas of Iraq to enable their use as transit zones. ISIS continues to use Ninewa province in northwestern Iraq to move supplies and personnel to support its attack cells in eastern Iraq. Iraq’s government is attempting to limit ISIS movements, though Ninewa’s geographic and demographic features challenge this effort. ISIS likely retains some access to rural Arab communities due to Yazidi-Arab tensions stemming from the aftermath of ISIS atrocities and subsequent retribution attacks in the 2014–17 period.
Somalia. The Islamic State is leveraging networks across multiple continents to sustain both new and established affiliates. A US military raid in northern Somalia killed a key ISIS facilitator in northern Somalia. This facilitator oversaw a sprawling financial and logistical support network from Somalia that coordinated trainers and funding to Islamic State affiliates in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Mozambique. His death may temporarily disrupt these activities.
Afghanistan-Pakistan. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) significantly escalated its attack campaign against the Pakistani state with a major suicide bombing targeting police in northwestern Pakistan on January 30. Conflicting TTP responses to the attack could demonstrate internal TTP divisions over strategy and ideology. These divisions, as well as tensions between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP faction that conducted the attack, could lead this faction to ally itself with the Islamic State’s branch in the region. Afghan Taliban support for the TTP will continue to strain the Taliban’s relationship with Pakistan and increases the likelihood of Pakistani military action against TTP havens in Afghanistan.
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Iran Crisis Update, February 2, 2023
Feb 2, 2023 – Press ISW
A group of pragmatic hardliners is continuing to cohere around calls for the regime to reconcile with its alienated population in the wake of the Mahsa Amini protests. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—a hardline Iranian official and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General—urged the regime to examine its weaknesses on February 2, expounding on his February 1 comments about schisms between the Islamic Republic and its population. Ghalibaf warned that Iran’s enemies would exploit its weaknesses if the regime failed to probe them. Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei separately urged Iranian officials to rectify economic, livelihood, and social justice issues and stated that Iran’s adversaries would “seize this weakness,” rhetorically mirroring Ghalibaf’s warning on the same date. Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi additionally stated that the regime must engage in constructive dialogue with activists who operate within the ideological framework of the Islamic Republic and stressed the importance of political participation on February 2. Vahidi is an IRGC Brigadier General and formed Quds Force Commander and was the Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister under former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Vahidi is currently an elected official of the ultra-hardline Raisi administration and oversees the Iranian Law Enforcement Command–which the regime mobilizes to violently suppress anti-regime demonstrations—making Vahidi’s calls for improving political engagement with the Iranian population particularly noteworthy. Vahidi previously acknowledged that the Mahsa Amini protest movement had created deep sociopolitical fissures between the regime and Iranian youth on January 26. Ghalibaf’s, Ejei’s, and Vahidi’s comments follow former President Hassan Rouhani’s February 1 statement implying that Iranian leadership had lost the support of its population.
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 2, 2023
Feb 2, 2023 – Press ISW
A Ukrainian intelligence official stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian military to capture Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by March 2023, supporting ISW’s most likely course of action assessment (MLCOA) for a Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Chernyak told the Kyiv Post on February 1 that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian military to capture all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by March 2023. Chernyak also stated that Russian forces are redeploying additional unspecified assault groups, units, weapons, and military equipment to unspecified areas of eastern Ukraine, likely in the Luhansk Oblast area.
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 1, 2023
Feb 1, 2023 – Press ISW
Ukrainian officials are continuing to warn about Russia’s intention of conducting a decisive offensive operation in Donbas in February and/or March, supporting ISW’s most likely course of action assessment (MLCOA). Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov stated on February 1 that Ukraine is on the eve of an active phase of combat that will take place over the next two months. Yusov noted that the poor state of Russian military equipment will force the Russian military command to mass forces to outnumber Ukrainian defenders in order to make gains. Ukrainian Colonel Serhiy Hrabskyi stated that Russia does not have sufficient forces to conduct an attack along the entire 1,500km frontline in Ukraine and will concentrate its efforts on seizing Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. A prominent Russian milblogger observed that the prospect of a Russian offensive operation does not appear to be triggering panic among Ukrainian forces, who are continuing to build out their counteroffensive plans. ISW reported on January 31 that Ukrainian military officials reiterated their intent to launch major counteroffensive operations by summer 2023.
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Iran Crisis Update, February 1, 2023
Feb 1, 2023 – Press ISW
Iranian officials across the political spectrum are cohering around different lessons the regime should draw from the protest movement and how to best respond. Former reformist president Hassan Rouhani criticized the regime for marginalizing moderate and reformist actors in the political sphere in an interview on February 1. Rouhani implied that Iranian leadership had lost the support of the Iranian population and acknowledged the existence of deep societal fissures following the Mahsa Amini protest movement. Rouhani urged Iranian officials to address protester grievances by enforcing corresponding cultural and political changes, although he did not specify the nature or content of these changes. Rouhani framed deepening divides between Iranian leadership and its population as a serious threat to the legitimacy and preservation of the regime, stating: “we have no choice but to preserve and fix the regime […] we must bring the people who have turned away from us back into the fold.” Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—a hardline Iranian official and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General—echoed Rouhani’s warnings of schisms between the regime and its people on February 1. Ghalibaf stressed the importance of Iranian leadership maintaining a dialogue with the population and stated that “the Islamic Revolution has no meaning without the participation of the people […] the people are the foundation of the revolution.”
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 31, 2023
Jan 31, 2023 – Press ISW
The introduction of Russian conventional forces to the Bakhmut frontline has offset the culmination of the Wagner Group’s offensive and retained the initiative for Russian operations around the city. The ISW December 27 forecast that the Russian offensive against Bakhmut was culminating was inaccurate. The Wagner Group offensive culminated, as ISW assessed on January 28, but the Russian command has committed sufficient conventional Russian forces to the effort to reinvigorate it, thus forestalling the overall culmination of the offensive on Bakhmut, which continues. The commander of a Ukrainian unit operating in Bakhmut, Denys Yarolavskyi, confirmed that “super qualified” Russian conventional military troops are now reinforcing Wagner Group private military company (PMC) assault units in an ongoing effort to encircle Bakhmut. Another Ukrainian Bakhmut frontline commander, Volodymyr Nazarenko, also confirmed ISW’s observations that the Russian military command committed Russian airborne troops to the Bakhmut offensive. Russian forces are continuing to conduct offensive operations northeast and southwest of Bakhmut and have secured limited territorial gains since capturing Soledar on January 12.
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This page collects ISW and CTP’s updates on the conflict in Ukraine. In late February 2022, ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.
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