Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 2, 2025

Apr 2, 2025 – ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 2, 2025

Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel

April 2, 2025, 6:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on April 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian officials are continuing to exploit the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire’s vague or unfinalized terms. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 2 that the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire is in effect and that Russia is adhering to the ceasefire.[1] Peskov claimed that Ukraine has “not joined” the temporary ceasefire “essentially” and that Russia intends to discuss this with the United States. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on April 1 that Russia forwarded a list of Ukraine’s alleged ceasefire violations to US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the United Nations (UN), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 2 that Ukrainian forces are “systematically” conducting drone and artillery strikes against Russian energy infrastructure.[3] The exact contours of the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire remain unclear, and Ukraine and Russia do not appear to have formally agreed on the list of objects covered in the ceasefire or the types of strikes prohibited. ISW previously noted that it is unclear if the temporary ceasefire prohibits striking energy infrastructure with shorter-range tube or rocket artillery.[4] It is also unclear how Ukraine could violate a temporary ceasefire that it has “not joined.”

US officials reportedly continue to acknowledge Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unwillingness to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine. Two US officials familiar with the matter told Reuters on April 1 that senior Trump administration officials have discussed the likelihood that the United States will not be able to secure a long-term peace agreement in Ukraine in the coming months and are preparing new plans to pressure Russia and Ukraine into an agreement.[5] The sources noted that Trump administration officials acknowledged that Putin is actively resisting US efforts to accomplish a peace agreement in Ukraine and used a series of meetings and calls over the weekend of March 29-30 to discuss possible mechanisms to bring Russia to the negotiating table. A senior US official stated that the Trump administration is considering levying additional tariffs and sanctions against Russia. Another source familiar with the discussions similarly told Fox News on April 1 that US President Donald Trump believes that Putin is “slow-rolling” negotiations on a general ceasefire in Ukraine and that the Trump administration is considering increasing sanctions against Russia in order to force Putin to the negotiating table.[6] Trump recently told NBC News that he is considering additional sanctions against Russian oil and stated during a press conference on March 30 that there is an unspecified “psychological deadline” for Russia to agree to a general ceasefire agreement.[7] ISW previously noted that it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure against Russia with economic tools alone, as Russia’s ongoing and forecasted future economic struggles are closely tied to Russian military losses on the battlefield.[8] The United States can leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position by continuing — or increasing — military aid to Ukraine such that Ukrainian forces can continue to inflict significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.

CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev will reportedly meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Washington, D.C. on April 2. Unnamed US officials and other unspecified sources familiar with Dmitriev’s trip told CNN on April 1 that Dmitriev will meet with Witkoff later this week in Washington, D.C., and sources told CNN and CBS that the US government temporarily lifted sanctions against Dmitriev in order to grant him a visa to visit the United States.[9] Sources told CBS on April 2 that Dmitriev will meet with Witkoff on April 2, but the Trump administration has not published information about the meeting.[10] It is unclear if the meeting has occurred as of this publication. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 2 that Dmitriev’s visit to Washington, D.C. is possible, and Dmitriev inconclusively responded to US reporting on his possible visit with “maybe.”[11]

The Russian military command reportedly began reorganizing the motorized rifle brigades of the 51st and 3rd combined arms armies (CAAs) such that each army would have three rifle divisions or motorized rifle divisions, likely in an effort to improve the CAAs’ administrative structure, especially over larger numbers of unmechanized riflemen. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 2 that the Russian military command may be reorganizing the motorized rifle brigades of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) such that both armies would have three “motorized” rifle divisions each.[12] The 51st CAA currently includes six motorized rifle brigades on paper: the 1st, 5th, 9th, 110th, 114th, and 132nd motorized rifle brigades. The 3rd CAA also includes six motorized rifle brigades on paper: the 4th, 6th, 7th, 85th, 88th, and 123rd motorized rifle brigades. Mashovets stated that some unspecified brigades in the 51st and 3rd CAAs are already staffed at levels significantly higher than a typical brigade, at least on paper.[13] Mashovets noted that the brigades are already operating at the front and have control over a number of other units – usually rifle or motorized rifle regiments and battalions – attached to the brigade. Mashovets stated that “it is assumed” that each of the new motorized rifle divisions in the 51st and 3rd CAAs will consist of two assault regiments, two “reinforcement” regiments, and an artillery regiment as well as organic logistics support units at the division-level, but that the divisions‘ are unlikely to have combat engineer or anti-aircraft missile units at the regimental level, as is normal for most Russian motorized rifle divisions. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command plans to create the 1st, 110th, and 132nd motorized rifle divisions within the 51st CAA. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command plans to form the 132nd Motorized Rifle Division on the basis of the 101st and 109th motor rifle regiments and plans to consolidate the 269th, 270th and 272nd rifle battalions into the 103rd Rifle Regiment. Mashovets stated that the only truly mechanized “motorized rifle” unit in the 132nd Motorized Rifle Division will be the 1436th Motorized Rifle Regiment. Mashovets stated that it is unclear if each new division will include a tank regiment and that the situation with tanks “will be very tense,” likely given Russia’s shortage of main battle tanks. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command may be making these changes to improve the organizational and staff structure in the 51st and 3rd CAAs in order to “streamline” their command and control processes. Mashovets stated that these changes are unlikely to significantly increase the number of troops in the CAAs or their combat capabilities beyond that of an army corps.[14] ISW has not observed other reports of the Russian military command restructuring the 51st and 3rd CAAs.

The Russian military command reorganized the 1st DNR AC and 2nd LNR AC into the 51st and 3rd CAAs, respectively, in Summer 2024 as part of wider efforts to integrate irregular forces into the Russian Armed Forces.[15] Elements of the 51st CAA are currently operating in the Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions, and elements of the 3rd CAA are currently operating in the Siversk and Chasiv Yar directions and in Belgorod Oblast.[16] The Russian military command has especially attempted to leverage elements of the 51st CAA in offensive operations in the Kurakhove, Pokrovsk, and Toretsk directions in recent months.[17] Most CAAs in the Russian military include less than three divisions, with only the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) including three divisions.[18] Mashovets’ report suggests that the Russian military does not seek to  equip the divisions of the 51st and 3rd CAAs  to a normal Russian motorized rifle division’s the full doctrinal end strength, suggesting that the restructuring is in response to specific command and control of force structure challenges afflicting the former DNR 1st and LNR 2nd Army Corps given their hasty reorganization into CAAs.[19]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 1 that Russian forces in Ukraine are continuing to use ammunition equipped with chemical agents prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces recorded 767 cases of Russian forces using regulated K-51 and RG-VO grenade launchers to launch munitions containing chemical agents and ammunition containing unspecified hazardous chemicals that are banned under the CWC in March 2025. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces have used banned chemical agents a total of 7,730 times since February 2023.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials are continuing to exploit the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire’s vague or unfinalized terms.
• US officials reportedly continue to acknowledge Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unwillingness to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine.
• CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev will reportedly meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Washington, D.C. on April 2.
• The Russian military command reportedly began reorganizing the motorized rifle brigades of the 51st and 3rd combined arms armies (CAAs) such that each army would have three rifle divisions or motorized rifle divisions, likely in an effort to improve the CAAs’ administrative structure, especially over larger numbers of unmechanized riflemen.
• The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 1 that Russian forces in Ukraine are continuing to use ammunition equipped with chemical agents prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian authorities continued efforts to solidify their control over the Russian information space and discourage critique of the Russian military’s conduct of the war in Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.

Russian sources continued to claim on April 2 that Ukrainian forces violated the temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a substation near Klyukva, Kursk Oblast and shelled an energy facility in another area of Kursk Oblast on the morning of April 2.[21] Luganskgaz, a Russian-controlled energy company operating in occupied Luhansk Oblast, claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Svatove gas distribution station in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[22]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 2 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone struck an electrical substation in Sumy Oblast and that an artillery strike damaged a power line in Nikopil, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast overnight from April 1 to 2 leaving almost 4,000 residents of both oblasts without power.[23]

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border on April 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Zhuravka and near Basivka (both northeast of Sumy City).[24]

Russian sources claimed that fighting continued northeast of Sumy City near Basivka and Zhuravka; south of Sudzha near Guyevo and Plekhovo; and southwest of Suzdha near Oleshnya.[25]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian “Arbat” Special Purpose Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[26] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near the Kursk Oblast border.[27] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the “Anvar Spetsnaz” detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating in Guyevo.[28]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on April 2 but did not make confirmed advances.